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This paper investigates whether variations in macroeconomic un-
certainty distort banks’ allocation of loanable funds by aﬀecting the
predictability of banks’ returns from lending. Low levels of macroeco-
nomic uncertainty will allow bankers to base their lending decisions on
more accurate evaluations of diﬀerent lending opportunities, leading
to a more unequal distribution of lending across banks. Contrarily,
increased macroeconomic uncertainty will hinder bankers’ ability to
identify and channel funds towards the best opportunities, inducing
more similar lending behavior across banks. Our empirical analysis
provides support for the hypothesis that macroeconomic uncertainty
adversely aﬀects the eﬃcient allocation of loanable funds.
JEL: C22, C23, D81, E51.
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21 Introduction
In a pathbreaking 1956 study, McEvoy presents a snapshot of the U.S. bank-
ing industry by analyzing banks’ asset and liability reports as a whole, and
by various classiﬁcations including bank size. His study covers all data avail-
able in June 1953, a total of 13,435 banks, and presents information on the
‘bank-to-bank variation of total loans-to-asset ratio’ as well as commercial
and industrial loans, real estate loans and loans to individuals among other
ratios. Finding signiﬁcant diﬀerences among individual banks, he claims that
‘[I]t is in the details of portfolio policy that individual banks adjust their oper-
ations to lending and investing opportunities in their particular communities,
...’ (emphasis added). He continues to state ‘[T]he value of the present study
lies not, therefore, in discovery of the completely unknown, but rather in
conﬁrming and quantifying a highly plausible a priori idea’ (McEvoy (1956),
p. 469).
McEvoy provides us with a unique portrayal of banks’ total loan-to-asset
ratio dispersion including other major loan components. However, since that
time, no one else has provided similar statistical information which could
have helped us understand how the dispersion of loan-to-asset ratios changes
over time as the state of the macroeconomy evolves. Such an analysis would
be very valuable as commercial banks are considered to be an important
source of intermediated credit. They specialize in overcoming frictions in
the credit market by acquiring costly information on borrowers, and extend
credit based on that information along with market conditions.1 Firms that
1It is generally accepted that commercial banks play a special role in the macroeconomy.
See Gatev and Strahan (2003) and the references therein. Also note that banks may
overcome informational problems by monitoring and screening, establishing long term
relationships with ﬁrms, and utilizing other loan management principles. See, for example,
Mishkin (2000), and Hadlock and James (2002).
3are small, non-rated or those with poor credit ratings—in short, those ﬁrms
that suﬀer from asymmetric information problems—are likely to rely heavily
on bank loans given their inability to access the public securities markets on
attractive terms (or at all). Thus, any variation in bank lending behavior
may have a serious impact on these disadvantaged borrowers.2
There are various reasons why banks’ lending behavior would change over
time. We argue that since banks must acquire costly information on borrow-
ers before extending loans to new or existing customers, uncertainty about
economic conditions (and the likelihood of loan default) would have clear
eﬀects on their lending strategies over and above the movements of macroe-
conomic aggregates or the constraints posed by monetary policymakers’ ac-
tions, and would tend to distort the eﬃcient allocation of loanable funds.
In particular, we claim that higher uncertainty will hinder the ability of the
bank manager to accurately predict returns from available lending opportu-
nities. Contrarily, when the macroeconomic environment is more tranquil,
returns from each potential project will be more easily predictable allowing
the bank manager to lend to the projects with higher expected returns. This
argument implies that during times of higher macroeconomic uncertainty
banks behave more homogeneously, and that during times of low uncertainty
banks will have more latitude to behave idiosyncratically. In this view, sta-
bility of the macroeconomic environment will favor more eﬃcient allocation
of loanable funds.
To test these claims, we investigate whether changes in macroeconomic
uncertainty explain the time variation in the cross-sectional dispersion of
2See Houston and James (2001) and Schiantarelli (1996) for surveys of the role of
ﬁnancial constraints in ﬁrm’ investment behavior; Myers and Majluf (1984) who investigate
the ﬁnancing behavior of ﬁrms under asymmetric information; Hadlock and James (2002),
who discuss banks’ provision of “ﬁnancial slack”; and Petersen and Rajan (1994) who
consider the importance of relationship lending.
4loan-to-asset ratios of banks. We expect to ﬁnd that the cross-sectional
dispersion of loan-to-asset ratios narrows as greater economic uncertainty
hinders managers’ ability to accurately evaluate the expected returns from
lending. Furthermore, we investigate whether a reduction in macroeconomic
uncertainty leads to a more unequal distribution of lending across banks
as managers take advantage of more accurate information about diﬀerent
lending opportunities. In that case, macroeconomic tranquility would lead
to a widening of the cross-sectional distribution of banks’ loan-to-asset ratios.
Answers to these questions will not only complement the investigation
carried by McEvoy (1956), but also will give us another reason to promote
macroeconomic stability to stimulate the eﬃcient allocation of resources.
Beaudry, Caglayan and Schiantarelli (2001) put this claim into close empir-
ical scrutiny by investigating the impact of aggregate price uncertainty on
the time-variation in the cross-sectional distribution of investment at the ag-
gregate and the industry level. Using UK ﬁrm level data, they show that
the cross-sectional distribution of ﬁrm investment narrows—implying more
homogeneous investment behavior across ﬁrms during times of uncertainty—
whereas a reduction in inﬂation uncertainty leads to a widening of the dis-
persion as higher-quality information allows ﬁrms to invest in projects with
diﬀering expected returns. Their ﬁndings provide evidence that inﬂation
uncertainty hinders the eﬃcient allocation of resources. The empirical ap-
proach we follow here is closely related to that of Beaudry et al. as we test
for the eﬀects of macroeconomic uncertainty on commercial banks’ allocation
of loans.3
3A related paper by Baum, Caglayan, Ozkan and Talavera (2006) investigates the
relationship between ﬁrms’ cash holdings and uncertainty. They show that an increase
in uncertainty induces similar movements in ﬁrms’ cash-to-asset ratios whereas economic
tranquility promotes more idiosyncratic behavior across ﬁrms.
5Our investigation utilizes U.S. bank-level data from the Federal Reserve
System’s Commercial Bank and Bank Holding Company database, which
contains all banks regulated by the Federal Reserve System, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Comptroller of the Currency. The
extract of this data set employed here covers essentially all banks in the U.S.
on a quarterly basis from 1979–2003Q3, with 8,600–15,500 observations per
calendar quarter, and a total of 1,241,206 bank-quarters. We also validate
our empirical ﬁndings using a separate, annual sample of several hundred
large banks from Standard and Poor’s Bank COMPUSTAT data set, which
yields qualitatively similar ﬁndings.
Empirical investigation of these data yields the following observations.
There is a clear negative association between proxies for macroeconomic un-
certainty and the cross-sectional variability of banks’ loan-to-asset ratios:
that is, banks’ lending behavior becomes more homogeneous in times of in-
creased uncertainty. This association strongly holds for total bank loans and
for two major loan components—real estate loans and loans to households—
showing that our results are not driven by aggregation but are genuine.
However, we obtain mixed results for the commercial and industrial loans
category, which might be due to the presence of ﬁrm–speciﬁc characteris-
tics such as existence of credit lines between banks and ﬁrms during times
of uncertainty. Finally, our results are robust to the introduction of several
other variables controlling for changes in monetary policy such as the Federal
funds rate, inﬂation rate, the index of leading indicators, and an indicator of
regulatory changes.
Our approach to investigating the bank lending behavior across banks, to
our knowledge, is unique in the banking literature as we concentrate on the
distribution of bank lending and analyze the behavioral impact of uncertainty
6on all banks in the US. However, similar to Beaudry et al. (2001), our main
purpose is to evaluate the consequences of uncertainty on the allocation of
resources, in this case loanable funds. The rest of the paper is constructed
as follows. Section 2 discusses how macroeconomic uncertainty may aﬀect
the lending behavior of banks. Section 3 documents our empirical ﬁndings,
while Section 4 concludes and draws implications for future theoretical and
empirical research.
2 Assessing bank lending under uncertainty
In a world with perfect information one need only consider the key indica-
tors of macroeconomic performance to evaluate the outcome of a stimulus to
the supply of credit. However, given that banks rarely exhaust their lend-
ing capacity, asymmetric information problems induced by macroeconomic
volatility render it crucial to evaluate the degree to which macroeconomic
uncertainty will aﬀect the banking sector’s willingness to fully loan available
funds.4 In the presence of uncertainty, it is likely that not only the ﬁrst
moments (such as the rate of GDP growth, the level of interest rates, or
the level of inﬂation) but also the second moments (measures of uncertainty
about those magnitudes) will matter.
We must point out that any partial-equilibrium investigation of banks’
behavior in extending credit must ensure that variations in the volume of
credit reﬂect the supply side of the market for loanable funds. The literature
contains a variety of evidence suggesting that in periods of monetary tight-
ening, ﬁrms may substitute non-bank ﬁnance for bank loans; for instance,
Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (1993) ﬁnd that the issuance of commercial pa-
4For example, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) show that in equilibrium a loan market may be
characterized by credit rationing. This result is driven by imperfect information, present
in loan markets after banks have evaluated loan applications.
7per increases during these periods, while Calomiris, Himmelberg and Wachtel
(1995) show that the volume of trade credit granted by larger ﬁrms to their
smaller counterparts also increases. Despite this documented substitution,
there is still a signiﬁcant reduction in ﬁrm spending, particularly due to
small ﬁrms’ inability to tap alternative sources of ﬁnance (see, for example,
Gertler and Gilchrist (1994)). Kashyap, Lamont and Stein (1994) document
that during recessionary periods, inventory movements of non-rated compa-
nies were much more sensitive to their cash holdings than those of rated
companies. Notwithstanding these demonstrated eﬀects, our premise—that
bank lending behavior will vary with macroeconomic uncertainty—requires
only that banks face an excess supply of potential borrowers. Apart from
conditions approximating the depths of the Great Depression, it is diﬃcult
to imagine that this condition will not hold, for each bank and time period,
in our sample.
In a nutshell, assume that the manager of a commercial bank operates
in a risky environment and chooses the appropriate allocation of assets over
two asset classes: third-party securities and loans.5 Securities (even if free
of default risk) bear market risk, or price risk, but the market value of this
component of the bank’s asset portfolio has a predictable and manageable
response to both ﬁnancial-market and macroeconomic shocks. In contrast,
loans to private borrowers exhibit both market risk and default risk: and the
latter risk will often be correlated with macroeconomic conditions, as well
as with ﬁnancial-market outcomes such as changes in the cost of short-term
funds.6
5Two earlier papers of interest are Freixas, Parigi and Rochet (2000) which investigates
whether insolvency of one bank due to consumer spending uncertainty would generate a
chain reaction in the banking system, and Thakor and Udell (1984) which considers bank
loan commitments when the value of borrowers’ assets are uncertain.
6Although banks’ expected returns from their loan portfolio are much higher than
8One potential impetus for the choice between securities and loans can
be motivated by a simple portfolio optimization model in which managers
must rebalance their asset portfolios to maintain an appropriate level of risk
and expected return.7 This implies that banks readjust their exposure to
risky loans in the face of changes in perceived uncertainty about macroeco-
nomic factors, and the resulting likelihood of borrowers’ default, leading to
variations in the cross-sectional distribution of loan-to-asset ratios over time.
In the next section, we lay out the reduced form relationship that links
macroeconomic uncertainty to time variation in the cross-sectional distribu-
tion of banks’ loan-to-asset (LTA) ratios. We stress that our main concern
in this paper is not to test a speciﬁc model but to document and verify
the presence of an empirical relationship.8 We should also note that we do
not investigate the impact of uncertainty on the representative bank’s lend-
ing behavior, nor the changes in banks’ levels of deposits. These questions
are beyond the scope of the paper. However, both questions are interesting
and important, and have been investigated by various researchers including
Baum, Caglayan and Ozkan (2004) and Gatev and Strachan (2003). Con-
sidering these papers along with the current study should lead to a better
understanding of bank lending behavior under uncertainty.
those from “safe” third-party investments, they may ﬁnd these attractive expected returns
simply too risky; as The Economist recently stated, “... the percentage of American banks’
assets made up of securities, notably safe government bonds, has grown from 34% at the
beginning of 2001 to more than 40% today...with loans falling as a proportion.” (October
26th 2002, p. 91).
7The idea of treating bank asset allocation as a portfolio problem is not unique to us.
See, for example, Lucas and McDonald (1992) and the references therein.
8Appendix C presents a simple framework that provides a mechanism showing how the
empirical model could arise.
92.1 The reduced form model
The negative relationship between macroeconomic uncertainty and the cross-
sectional variation of banks’ LTA ratios can be intuitively explained as fol-
lows. During tranquil periods, each bank responds more accurately to loan
demand as bank managers take advantage of the perceived lending (invest-
ment) opportunities which may be more clearly identiﬁed in this environ-
ment in comparison to more turbulent times. Hence, as banks behave more
idiosyncratically, the cross-sectional distribution of LTA ratios should widen.
Contrarily, during times of uncertainty, the actual returns to lending will be
harder to predict. Under these conditions, as bank managers would have
greater diﬃculty identifying proﬁtable lending opportunities, they will be-
have more homogeneously leading to a narrowing of the cross-sectional dis-
tribution of LTA ratios.
To provide support for our hypothesis, we consider the following reduced
form relationship:
Dispt(Lit/TAit) = β0 + β1σ
2
ν,t + et, (1)
where Dispt(Lit/TAit) is a measure (the standard deviation) of the cross-
sectional dispersion of banks’ loan-to-asset ratio at time t, σ2
ν,t denotes the
macroeconomic uncertainty at time t and et is an i.i.d. error term. Our
claim is that the spread of the distribution of LTA ratios—the heterogeneity
exhibited by commercial banks’ diverse behavior—is negatively related to a
measure of macroeconomic uncertainty. Hence, we would expect to ﬁnd a
negative sign on β1 if greater macroeconomic uncertainty was associated with
a smaller dispersion of banks’ loan-to-asset ratios.
102.2 Identifying macroeconomic uncertainty
To provide an appropriate proxy for macroeconomic uncertainty as perceived
by banks’ managers, we make use of the conditional variance of industrial pro-
duction, a measure of the economy’s health available at a higher (monthly)
frequency than that of the national income aggregates. As an alternate mea-
sure focusing on the ﬁnancial sector, we use the conditional variance of CPI
inﬂation.9 Therefore, we rewrite equation (1) in the following form:
Dispt(Lit/TAit) = β0 + β1ˆ ht + et, (2)
where ˆ ht represents macroeconomic uncertainty, captured by the conditional
variance of industrial production or CPI inﬂation evaluated at time t. The
advantage of this approach is that we can relate the behavior of bank loans
directly to a measurable variable for economic uncertainty.10
Our proxies for macroeconomic uncertainty are derived from monthly
industrial production (International Financial Statistics series 66IZF) and
from consumer price inﬂation (IFS series 64XZF).11 In each case, we ﬁt a
generalized ARCH (GARCH) model to the series, where the mean equation
is an autoregression (AR(1) for industrial production, AR(2) for inﬂation).12
The conditional variance derived from this GARCH model for each proxy,
averaged to annual or quarterly frequency, is then used as our measure of
macroeconomic uncertainty (ˆ ht). In some of the estimated models, we use a
weighted average of the current and last three quarters’ conditional variances.
9The conditional variances of industrial production or inﬂation are better suited for our
purposes than that of any monetary aggregate, for any signs of weakness or overheating
in the economy will show up initially in the behavior of production and inﬂation.
10Although ˆ ht is a generated regressor, the coeﬃcient estimates for equation (2) are con-
sistent; see Pagan (1984, 1986). We employ instrumental variables estimation to mitigate
any problems of measurement error in the construction of these proxies.
11We also tested measures of uncertainty derived from quarterly GDP and its growth
rate; since the results were broadly similar we preferred the monthly series.
12Details of the GARCH models for CPI and IP are given in Appendix B.
11We tested each of these constructed proxies for stationarity via DF-GLS
and Clemente–Monta˜ n´ es–Reyes (CMR) unit root tests. The DF-GLS test is
an improved version of the Augmented Dickey–Fuller test, while the CMR
tests examine the series allowing for the presence of one or two innovational
outlier (IO) structural breaks.13 Although the DF-GLS tests were unable to
reject the null of I(1) for the conditional variance of industrial production
or its weighted average, the CMR tests were able to reject the unit root null
for either one or two structural breaks for those series. Both the DF-GLS
and CMR tests handily rejected their I(1) null for the conditional variance
of inﬂation. Detailed results are available on request.
3 Empirical ﬁndings
3.1 Data
The main data set we exploit in our empirical analysis is a comprehensive
data set for U.S. commercial banks: the Federal Reserve System’s Commercial
Bank and Bank Holding Company (BHC) database which covers essentially
all banks in the U.S. on a quarterly basis from 1979–2003Q3. The degree
of concentration in the U.S. banking industry (which increased considerably
over our period of analysis) implies that a very large fraction of the observa-
tions in the data set are associated with quite small, local institutions.14 We
also use Standard and Poor’s Bank COMPUSTAT database to conﬁrm the
results obtained from the BHC database. This database is an unbalanced
panel of annual observations for the largest and the strongest banks in the
13For more details on the CMR test, please see [1].
14There were over 15,500 banks required to ﬁle condition reports in the early 1980s. By
2003Q4, the number of reporting banks fell to 8,661.
12US over the 1980–2002 period.15
In our empirical investigation, we analyze total loans as well as its three
major components (real estate loans, loans to households, and commercial
and industrial loans) to ensure that our ﬁndings are not a result of aggre-
gation but they are robust. The BHC data set provides us with measures
of loans to the private sector: three loan categories (real estate loans, loans
to households, and commercial and industrial loans), total loans and total
assets.16
Descriptive statistics on the loan-to-asset ratios that we obtain from the
BHC data set are presented in Table 1. From the means of the annual
sample over the entire period, we see that bank loans constituted about 55%
of total assets, with household and commercial/industrial (C&I) loans having
similar importance. Splitting the sample at 1991–1992, when Basel Accord
risk-based capital standards fully came to bear, we observe a considerable
increase in the importance of real estate loans, and a somewhat lesser decline
in the importance of household loans after that period. A similar pattern for
the loan categories’ changes is visible in their median (p50) values. Banks’
reliance on loans increased by several percentage points, in terms of mean or
median values, between the early 1990s and the later period.
In the following subsections, we present our results, ﬁrst considering the
dynamics of the loan-to-asset ratios themselves without reference to macroe-
conomic uncertainty. Then we proceed with presenting the estimates of our
models linking the dispersion of the LTA ratios’ distribution to measures of
macroeconomic uncertainty.
15Real estate loans, loans to households, commercial and industrial loans, total loans
and total assets are COMPUSTAT items data14, data20, data21, data23 and data36,
respectively.
16Details of the construction of these measures from the BHC database are presented
in Appendix A.
133.2 The link between lending and uncertainty
Figure 1 displays the quartiles of the LTA distribution for total loans and the
three major categories. There is a sizable increase in the importance of real
estate loans over these decades, while loans to households show some decline
in importance over the period. We also may note the general decline in the
importance of C&I lending through the mid-1980s. Lown and Peristiani sug-
gest that a shift away from C&I lending over the last several decades reﬂected
“a declining trend in the intermediation role of banks” (1996, p.1678).17 The
visible increase in loan-to-asset ratios over the sample period appears to be
driven by real estate loans, which are displacing the traditional C&I loans as
a larger fraction of banks’ loan portfolios.
However, we do not focus upon these measures of central tendency, but
rather upon the dispersion of banks’ LTA ratios around their mean values.
To formally test our hypothesis, as presented in equation (2), we use the
standard deviation of the loan-to-asset ratio (LTA Sigma) as a measure of
the cross-sectional dispersion of bank loans.18
3.2.1 Model speciﬁcation
The relation between the dispersion of banks’ LTA ratios and macroeco-
nomic uncertainty is statistically tested in Tables 2–5 for total loans and for
the three loan categories, exploiting the BHC database. In Tables 6 and 7 we
depict results obtained from the Bank COMPUSTAT database: Table 6 por-
trays results for total loans and Table 7 summarizes our results for the three
17A redeﬁnition of C&I loans in 2001Q1 created a break in this series. Consequently,
our empirical work uses data through 2000Q4 for this category of loans.
18The inter-quartile range (LTA IQR) or the range between 90th and 10th percentiles
(LTA 90 10) could also be examined in order to consider the behavior of the outlying ﬁrms.
Results from these measures are broadly similar to those derived from LTA Sigma, and
are not reported here.
14loan categories. In Table 2–7, we present instrumental variables–generalized
method of moments (IV-GMM) regression results with heteroskedasticity-
and autocorrelation-consistent (HAC) standard errors for each of the proxy
series.19 The dependent variable measures the standard deviation of the LTA
ratio for each category of loans; e.g. Tot Sigma for total loans, RE Sigma
for real estate loans, etc. In these models, we enter an indicator, (d BA)
for 1992Q1 and beyond to capture the eﬀect of the full implementation of
Basel Accord risk-based capital standards on banks’ lending behavior. In
the quarterly estimates from the BHC database, we consider both the con-
temporaneous uncertainty measures and three quarters’ lagged eﬀects of the
proxies for macroeconomic uncertainty: CV IP 03 and CV Infl 03, with
arithmetic lags over the current and prior three quarters’ values.20 Since
banks may already have extended irrevocable commitments to provide credit,
the observed change in the LTA ratio may only reﬂect desired alterations in
the supply of loans with a lag. We also include the Federal funds rate as a
factor inﬂuencing the supply of credit and a time trend. Columns (5) and (6)
of each panel of Tables 2–5 present results of regressions including two ad-
ditional control variables: the rate of CPI inﬂation and the detrended index
of leading indicators (computed from DRI-McGraw Hill Basic Economics se-
ries DLEAD) to judge the robustness of our results in the presence of these
macroeconomic factors.21
19Instruments used include several lagged values of both conditional variance series.
The J statistic in these tables is Hansen’s test of overidentifying restrictions, with their
p-values given below.
20We imposed an arithmetic lag structure on the values of the proxy variables with
weights 0.4, 0.3, 0.2, 0.1. Results based on once-lagged proxies for uncertainty were similar.
21We also investigated the explanatory power of other macroeconomic factors, such as
the GDP gap and the Bernanke-Mihov index (1998) of the impact of monetary policy.
Neither factor had a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the relationship across the loan categories.
153.2.2 Estimation results for the BHC data
We present our results obtained from regressing the variance of LTA ratios
for total loans on the conditional variances of IP and inﬂation in Table 2.
Columns 1 and 2 provide estimates of our baseline regressions. All estimated
models include the Federal funds rate to capture the stance of monetary
policy, d BA to capture the possible eﬀects of the Basel Accord and a time
trend to reﬂect secular movements in bank lending behavior and the level of
macroeconomic uncertainty. The coeﬃcients on both measures of uncertainty
are negative and signiﬁcant at the 1% level, as are the measures in columns
3 and 4 based on distributed lags of the conditional variances.
Since we are investigating this relationship over a 24-year period, one
may question if our ﬁndings are driven by other macroeconomic events. To
see if this is the case, columns 5 and 6 report regression results when we
introduce inﬂation and the index of leading indicators. Observe that these
additional regressors do not change our conclusion that uncertainty has a
negative impact on the dispersion of the LTA ratio for total loans. Finally,
to gain more insight, we compute the eﬀect of a 100 per cent increase in
uncertainty as captured by the conditional variances of IP and CPI inﬂation.
We ﬁnd that, at the end of one year, the dispersion of the LTA ratio for total
loans declines by 9.2% and 5.7%, respectively, each signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero.
Next, in Tables 3–5 we examine the same relationship for three major
components of loans: real estate loans, household loans and commercial and
industrial loans. Results for the real estate loan category (Table 3) are quite
strong, with each model’s uncertainty coeﬃcients negative and signiﬁcant at
the 1% level for the weighted average measures of the variances of industrial
production and inﬂation. A similar exercise to that above shows that the one-
16year cumulative eﬀect of a 100 per cent increase in uncertainty as captured
by the conditional variance of IP and CPI inﬂation is a 11.2% and 6.3%
reduction in the dispersion of real estate loans, respectively, each of which is
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
For the household loans category, reported in Table 4, each of the six
models contains a highly negative signiﬁcant coeﬃcient (at the 1% level for
all cases) on the macroeconomic uncertainty measure. In this category of
loans, the one-year cumulative eﬀect of a 100 per cent increase in uncertainty,
as captured by the conditional variances of IP and CPI inﬂation, is a 10.4%
and 6.6% reduction in the dispersion of household loans, respectively, both
of which diﬀer from zero at any conventional level of signiﬁcance.
Finally in Table 5, we present results for the commercial and industrial
loans category. Contrary to results presented earlier, the eﬀect of macro
uncertainty exhibits a signiﬁcant positive sign in all models. The one-year
cumulative eﬀect of a 100 per cent increase in uncertainty as captured by
the conditional variance of IP causes a 12.0% widening in the dispersion of
C&I loans, while that of CPI inﬂation rate leads to a widening of 8.3%, both
of which are distinguishable from zero. This observation contrasts with our
hypothesis that increases in macroeconomic uncertainty are expected to lead
to a narrowing of the dispersion. However, one can rationalize this ﬁnding
by recalling that U.S. banks make over 80 percent of all commercial and
industrial loans via loan commitments (Shockley and Thakor (1997)). It has
been argued that loan commitments—whereby banks sell promises to extend
future credit to their customers at partially predetermined terms—have been
widely used as an essential element of relationship banking. Relationship
banking can partially overcome capital market frictions and lower ﬁrms’ cost
of external ﬁnance. Thus, during times of uncertainty ﬁrms can beneﬁt from
17relationship banking and have access to C&I loans, which tend to be based
on “soft information” (Berger and Udell, 2004). In that case, given banks’
prior commitments, we would not necessarily expect homogenous behavior
in banks’ C&I lending in response to increased macro uncertainty.
3.2.3 Summary of BHC results
While commercial and industrial loans yield contrasting results to our propo-
sition, overall our empirical results derived from the BHC database provide
strong support for the hypothesis that ﬂuctuations in macroeconomic uncer-
tainty are associated with sizable alterations in the heterogeneity of banks’
lending behavior. We also document that the one-year cumulative eﬀect of a
100 per cent increase in uncertainty, as captured by the conditional variance
of IP (CPI inﬂation) leads to somewhere between a 9–11% (5–7%) reduction
in the dispersion of banks’ loan-to-asset ratios for total loans, real estate loans
and household loans. These ﬁndings support the view that uncertainty dis-
torts the eﬃcient allocation of funds across potential borrowers. However, we
also note that our measures of macroeconomic uncertainty appears to cause
an expansion in the dispersion of banks’ C&I loan-to-asset ratios. As men-
tioned above, this ﬁnding is in line with the fact that the preponderance of
C&I loans are made via loan commitments as a part of relationship banking,
which could help ﬁrms have access to loans during times of uncertainty.
3.2.4 Validation using the Bank COMPUSTAT database
To validate our ﬁndings, we applied the same model to a set of bank-level
data drawn from Standard and Poor’s Bank COMPUSTAT database over
1981–2002. Unlike the BHC data (which essentially encompass the universe
of commercial banks), Bank COMPUSTAT covers no more than 1,350 large,
traded banks, but the concentration of the commercial banking sector implies
18that these banks control a very sizable share of the banking system’s total
assets. Their lines of business diﬀer somewhat from those of the universe of
commercial banks, with real estate and commercial/industrial (C&I) loans
having similar importance among large banks.
Table 6 displays results for total loans based on the estimation of equation
(2) using the conditional variances of industrial production and inﬂation
along with several macroeconomic variables as controls. We consider both
the contemporaneous conditional variances and a weighted average of current
and lagged conditional variances (CV IP 01 and CV Inﬂ 01), with declining
arithmetic weights. The models including the conditional variance of inﬂation
all have negative and statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcients for that variable,
even when controlling for the level eﬀects of interest rates, inﬂation and the
leading indicators. Those including the conditional variance of industrial
production lack statistical signiﬁcance, but have the expected negative sign
in two of three cases. In Table 7, for brevity, we only display the results for
these latter two speciﬁcations by category of loan: real estate, household, and
commercial & industrial (C&I). These results are reasonably strong, with
the most satisfactory ﬁndings for household loans, and to a lesser degree
for real estate loans. The COMPUSTAT results for C&I loans echo the
positive association with uncertainty for the IP-based measure, while lacking
signiﬁcance for the inﬂation-based measure. This weakness of the model for
C&I loans may reﬂect the presence of other signiﬁcant factors, such as ﬁrm-
speciﬁc evaluation of borrowers’ prospects (based on “soft information”) or
extensive use of loan commitments (lines of credit) by borrowers.
Finally, to gain some insight on these results from the annual data, we
compute the eﬀect of a 100 per cent increase in uncertainty as captured
by the conditional variances of industrial production (IP) and CPI inﬂation.
19The overall eﬀect is similar in magnitude to that estimated from the universe
of commercial banks in the BHC database, despite the size and presumed
market power of the banks in the COMPUSTAT sample. The eﬀect of a
100 per cent increase in uncertainty proxied by IP (CPI inﬂation) is a 6.4%
(11.4%) reduction in the dispersion of banks’ total loan-to-asset ratios. These
ﬁgures substantiate our ﬁndings from the BHC database and conﬁrm the view
that macroeconomic uncertainty signiﬁcantly distorts the eﬃcient allocation
of funds among potential borrowers.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we argue that uncertainty about economic conditions should
have clear eﬀects on banks’ lending strategies over and above the movements
of macroeconomic aggregates or the constraints posed by monetary policy-
makers’ actions so as to distort the eﬃcient allocation of loanable funds. In
particular, we evaluate the role of macroeconomic uncertainty in explaining
the time variation in the cross-sectional dispersion of loan-to-asset ratios of
banks. We investigate whether the presence of greater macroeconomic un-
certainty leads to a narrowing of that dispersion, and conversely, whether
economic tranquility would provide banks with the latitude to behave more
idiosyncratically, leading to a widening of the cross-sectional dispersion of
banks’ LTA ratios.
To test this claim, we estimate a simple reduced-form equation using the
BHC database which provides comprehensive information on all U.S. banks.
These results are validated by reestimating the model on a sample of large
banks from the Bank COMPUSTAT database. The empirical results from
both datasets strongly support our hypothesis that increased macroeconomic
uncertainty leads to a narrowing of the dispersion of banks’ loan-to-asset
20ratios, disrupting the eﬃcient allocation of loanable funds. Our ﬁndings
hold for total loans and its two major components—real estate loans and
household loans—showing that the results are not driven by aggregation.
However, our analysis yield mixed results when we investigate commercial
and industrial loans which could reﬂect the importance of relationship lending
and loan commitments in that lending sector. Finally, we provide evidence
that our model is robust to the inclusion of macroeconomic factors that
capture the state of the economy.
It could be useful to evaluate our ﬁndings in the light of some earlier
work. For instance, Beaudry, Caglayan and Schiantarelli (2001) document
that an increase in macroeconomic uncertainty could lead to a signiﬁcant
reduction in the cross-sectional dispersion of the investment rate and mean-
ingful resource allocation problems. Gertler and Gilchrist (1996) suggest
that changes in credit market conditions may amplify the impact of initial
shocks, impairing ﬁrms’ and households’ access to credit although the need
for ﬁnance may be increasing at the time. A recent paper by Baum, Caglayan,
Ozkan and Talavera (2006) shows that increased uncertainty induces similar
movements in non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms’ cash-to-asset ratios while economic tran-
quility promotes more idiosyncratic behavior across ﬁrms. In this study, we
provide evidence that macroeconomic uncertainty signiﬁcantly distorts the
allocation of loanable funds, and that the magnitude of eﬀects that we ﬁnd
in this paper is qualitatively important: a change of 6% to 12% in banks’
loan-to-asset ratios’ dispersion in response to a doubling of macroeconomic
uncertainty. Although we do not provide an analysis regarding welfare con-
sequences, we conjecture that the overall impact of reducing macroeconomic
uncertainty would be quite substantial and that this message—“the second
moments matter”—should be of key relevance to economic policymakers.
21Appendix A: Construction of bank lending measures from the
Fed BHC database
The following variables from the on-line BHC database were used in the
quarterly empirical study. Many of the deﬁnitions correspond to those pro-
vided by on-line documentation of Kashyap and Stein (2000). We are grateful
to the research staﬀ of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago for assistance
with recent releases of the data.
RCFD2170: Average total assets
RCON1400: Total loans
RCON1410: Real estate loans
RCON1975: Loans to households
RCON1600: C&I loans, 1979Q1–2000Q4
22Appendix B: Proxies for macroeconomic uncertainty
Table B1. GARCH models proxying macroeconomic uncertainty
(1) (2)
log(IP) log( ˙ P)
log(IP)t−1 0.979
[0.012]***
log( ˙ P)t−1 1.246
[0.053]***





















Standard errors in brackets
Models are ﬁt to detrended log(IP) and log ˙ P.
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
23Appendix C: A simple analytical framework
The analytical framework we present here is a variant of the island model
used by Lucas (1973).
Each period, the bank manager allocates x per cent of total assets as loans
to the private sector and (100 − x) per cent to securities to maximize bank
proﬁts. The securities provide the risk free return (rf,t). The risky loans
yield a stochastic return based on a time-varying risk premium denoted by
˜ ri,t = rf,t + premiumi,t. The expected risk premium is E(premiumi,t) = ρ
and its variance is V ar(premiumi,t) = σ2
,t. Hence, the true return on risky
loans takes the form ˜ ri,t = rf,t + ρ + i,t where the random component i,t is
distributed as i,t ∼ N(0,σ2
,t). Variations in σ2
,t are observable, but a bank
manager does not know what her draw from this distribution will be at a
point in time. Also assume that i,t is orthogonal to j,t: each bank has a
speciﬁc set of borrowers with diﬀerent risk structures.
Although the bank manager, prior to allocating bank assets between the
risky and risk free alternatives, cannot observe the risk premium, she does
observe a noisy signal on i,t in the form of Si,t = i,t + νt. The random
variable νt denotes the noise, which is normally distributed as νt ∼ N(0,σ2
ν,t)
and independent of i,t. (Though the bank manager cannot observe σ2
ν,t, she
may form an optimal forecast of that quantity.) Each bank manager observes
a diﬀerent signal and the noise component of the observed signal in all cases
is identical, which proxies for the degree of macroeconomic uncertainty. In
times of greater turmoil in the economy, a higher variance of νt will render
bank managers’ estimates of the true returns on risky loans less accurate,
and vice versa.
Within this framework, a bank manager takes all available information
into consideration before making any decision, yet can still inadvertently
pursue suboptimal decisions since the information content of the signal tends
to change over time. Conditioning upon the signal Si,t, the manager can form






ν,t. Therefore, at each point in time, total expected returns
conditional on the signal takes the form
24E(˜ Yi,t|Si,t) = xi,t(rf,t + ρ + λtSi,t) + (1 − xi,t)rf,t, (C.1)
where ˜ Yi,t denotes total returns. The conditional variance of returns will be





Modeling the bank manager’s objective function using a simple expected
utility framework, E(˜ Ui,t|Si,t), which is increasing in the expected returns
and decreasing in the variance of returns conditional on the signal Si,t in the
form
E(˜ Ui,t|Si,t) = E(˜ Yi,t|Si,t) −
α
2
V ar(˜ Yi,t|Si,t), (C.3)
where α is the coeﬃcient of risk aversion, we can easily derive the ith bank’s














to investigate the eﬀects of the time variation in the variance of macroeco-
nomic uncertainty σ2
ν as it is this variance that reﬂects bank managers’ ability
to forecast the returns from loans and hence banks’ lending behavior.1 An
increase in macroeconomic uncertainty, as captured by an increase in σ2
ν,t,










1Recall that νt does not vary across banks. Hence, (C.5) follows.
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28Table 1: Loan-to-asset ratios: Descriptive statistics
µ σ p25 p50 p75
Full sample
RE 0.260 0.164 0.139 0.237 0.356
CI 0.111 0.090 0.049 0.090 0.150
HH 0.106 0.085 0.049 0.087 0.142
Total 0.548 0.162 0.457 0.568 0.660
Pre-1992
RE 0.215 0.139 0.116 0.197 0.289
CI 0.121 0.096 0.055 0.099 0.164
HH 0.121 0.085 0.061 0.103 0.162
Total 0.534 0.153 0.446 0.551 0.641
1992-2003Q3
RE 0.330 0.174 0.206 0.325 0.446
CI 0.092 0.074 0.042 0.076 0.122
HH 0.083 0.079 0.036 0.065 0.106
Total 0.569 0.172 0.480 0.597 0.689
Note: RE, CI, HH refer to loan-to-asset ratios for real estate loans, com-
mercial and industrial loans, and loans to households, respectively. CI statis-
tics cover the period 1979q1–2000q4. p25, p50 and p75 represent the quartiles
of the distribution, while µ and σ represent its mean and standard devia-
tion, respectively. The statistics for total loans are based on 1,241,206 bank-
quarters: 758,672 bank-quarters prior to 1992 and 482,534 bank-quarters
thereafter.
29Table 2: BHC results for total loans, 1980q4–2003q3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CV IP -0.420***
(0.050)










FedFunds -0.115*** -0.181*** -0.124*** -0.189*** -0.211*** -0.296***
(0.032) (0.038) (0.030) (0.035) (0.049) (0.055)
d BA -0.009** -0.021*** -0.009** -0.018*** -0.007 -0.014**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
t 0.210* 0.413*** 0.172* 0.378*** 0.135 0.234*
(0.091) (0.101) (0.087) (0.105) (0.091) (0.109)
Constant 0.181*** 0.175*** 0.184*** 0.175*** 0.184*** 0.181***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Quarters 92 92 92 92 92 92
ˆ η -0.100 -0.069 -0.103 -0.060 -0.092 -0.057
s.e. 0.012 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.009
J 6.985 7.804 5.884 10.364 7.313 10.649
J pvalue 0.430 0.350 0.553 0.169 0.397 0.155
HAC IV-GMM estimates, based on 1241206 bank-quarter obs.
∗ <10%, **<5%, ***< 1%
30Table 3: BHC results for real estate loans, 1980q4–2003q3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CV IP -0.354***
(0.078)










FedFunds 0.094 0.030 0.101 0.028 -0.081 -0.159**
(0.055) (0.052) (0.057) (0.057) (0.059) (0.056)
d BA 0.008 -0.003 0.007 -0.002 0.002 -0.006
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004)
t 0.563*** 0.748*** 0.538*** 0.723*** 0.614*** 0.822***
(0.120) (0.122) (0.123) (0.126) (0.093) (0.090)
Constant 0.128*** 0.123*** 0.131*** 0.125*** 0.132*** 0.121***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006)
Quarters 92 92 92 92 92 92
ˆ η -0.089 -0.052 -0.102 -0.053 -0.112 -0.063
s.e. 0.020 0.011 0.018 0.014 0.019 0.012
J 8.155 7.543 8.418 7.362 9.010 7.783
J pvalue 0.319 0.375 0.297 0.392 0.252 0.352
HAC IV-GMM estimates, based on 1245923 bank-quarter obs.
∗ <10%, **<5%, ***< 1%
31Table 4: BHC results for household loans, 1980q4–2003q3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CV IP -0.212***
(0.035)










FedFunds 0.085*** 0.039* 0.080*** 0.026 0.072** 0.009
(0.020) (0.019) (0.015) (0.018) (0.024) (0.024)
d BA 0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
t -0.131** -0.088** -0.157*** -0.092** -0.124** -0.071
(0.046) (0.033) (0.040) (0.035) (0.044) (0.040)
Constant 0.089*** 0.088*** 0.090*** 0.089*** 0.089*** 0.089***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Quarters 92 92 92 92 92 92
ˆ η -0.103 -0.070 -0.106 -0.068 -0.104 -0.066
s.e. 0.017 0.010 0.012 0.009 0.013 0.010
J 6.347 8.220 6.452 8.357 5.991 8.853
J pvalue 0.500 0.314 0.488 0.302 0.541 0.263
HAC IV-GMM estimates, based on 1205914 bank-quarter obs.
∗ <10%, **<5%, ***< 1%
32Table 5: BHC results for C&I loans, 1980q4–2000q4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CV IP 0.145***
(0.034)










FedFunds 0.013 0.059 0.000 0.071 0.137*** 0.196***
(0.039) (0.042) (0.055) (0.039) (0.025) (0.021)
d BA -0.008 -0.005 -0.012* -0.008 -0.005* -0.004*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
t -0.246* -0.269* -0.141 -0.112 -0.278*** -0.250***
(0.105) (0.104) (0.127) (0.146) (0.054) (0.062)
Constant 0.093*** 0.092*** 0.089*** 0.082*** 0.089*** 0.089***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005)
Quarters 81 81 81 81 81 81
ˆ η 0.069 0.043 0.099 0.077 0.120 0.083
s.e. 0.016 0.013 0.033 0.026 0.028 0.021
J 5.885 6.870 6.894 6.253 7.248 5.845
J pvalue 0.553 0.442 0.440 0.511 0.404 0.558
HAC IV-GMM estimates, based on 1218180 bank-quarter obs.
∗ <10%, **<5%, ***< 1%
33Table 6: Bank COMPUSTAT results for total loans, 1981–2002
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CV IP 0.409
(0.624)










FedFunds -0.198 -0.372* -0.069 -0.293* -0.130 -0.319***
(0.161) (0.156) (0.166) (0.127) (0.093) (0.080)
d BA 0.020 -0.012 0.025* -0.002 0.009* 0.004
(0.011) (0.018) (0.011) (0.011) (0.004) (0.002)
t 0.650 2.247 0.064 1.276 2.037*** 1.941***
(0.916) (1.161) (0.876) (0.710) (0.375) (0.267)
Constant -1.181 -4.294 0.000 -2.376 -3.937*** -3.732***
(1.828) (2.296) (1.745) (1.411) (0.746) (0.533)
N 19 19 19 19 19 19
ˆ η 0.102 -0.224 -0.096 -0.151 -0.064 -0.114
s.e. 0.156 0.085 0.092 0.045 0.039 0.022
J 4.903 2.922 4.722 3.257 4.222 2.451
J pvalue 0.179 0.404 0.193 0.354 0.239 0.484
HAC IV-GMM estimates, based on 10497 bank-year obs.
∗ <10%, **<5%, ***< 1%
34Table 7: Bank COMPUSTAT results for loan categories, 1981–2002
Real Est Real Est Household Household C & I C & I
CV IP 01 -0.170 -0.215*** 0.316*
(0.196) (0.056) (0.127)
CV Inﬂ 01 -0.223*** -0.082*** 0.036
(0.035) (0.012) (0.029)
Inﬂation 0.008*** 0.009*** -0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
LeadIndic -0.000 0.001 -0.002*** -0.002*** 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
FedFunds -0.252 -0.396*** 0.071 -0.031 0.035 0.164*
(0.130) (0.102) (0.042) (0.042) (0.092) (0.067)
d BA -0.000 -0.010 -0.002 -0.004 0.002 0.004
(0.005) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
t 4.132*** 4.385*** 1.429*** 1.486*** 1.315*** 1.163**
(0.571) (0.544) (0.238) (0.206) (0.312) (0.363)
Constant -8.120*** -8.602*** -2.760*** -2.873*** -2.548*** -2.241**
(1.136) (1.081) (0.474) (0.409) (0.620) (0.722)
N 19 19 19 19 19 19
ˆ η -0.046 -0.127 -0.088 -0.071 0.110 0.026
s.e. 0.053 0.020 0.023 0.010 0.045 0.021
J 5.790 3.039 5.241 2.991 5.586 4.847
J pvalue 0.122 0.386 0.155 0.393 0.134 0.183































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1. Loan-to-asset ratios